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Conflict in the Niger Delta.....Wikipedia,

Map of Nigeria numerically showing states typically considered part of the Niger Delta region: 1. Abia, 2. Akwa Ibom, 3. Bayelsa, 4. Cross River, 5. Delta, 6. Edo, 7.Imo, 8. Ondo, 9. Rivers Click to view

Conflict in the Niger Delta arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the foreign oil corporations and a number of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups who felt they were being exploited, particularly the Ogoni as well as the Ijaw in the late 1990s. Ethnic and political unrest has continued throughout the 1990s and persists as of 2007 despite the conversion to democracy and the election of the Obasanjo government in 1999. Competition for oil wealth has fuelled violence between innumerable ethnic groups, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups as well as Nigerian military and police forces (notably the Nigerian Mobile Police). Victims of crimes are fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of growing "impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses, [which] has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence".^{[citation needed]} The regional and ethnic conflicts are so numerous that fully detailing each is impossible and impractical. However, there have been a number of major confrontations that deserve elaboration.

An environment of crisis: background

See also Environmental issues in the Niger Delta and Petroleum in Nigeria

Map of Nigeria numerically showing states typically considered part of the Niger Delta region: 1. Abia, 2. Akwa Ibom, 3. Bayelsa, 4. Cross River, 5. Delta, 6. Edo, 7.Imo, 8. Ondo, 9. Rivers Click to view

Nigeria, after nearly four decades of oil production, had by the early 1990s become almost completely dependent on petroleum extraction economically, generating 25% of its GDP (this has since risen to 40% as of 2000). Despite the vast wealth created by petroleum, the benefits have been slow to trickle down to the majority of the population, who since the 1960s have increasingly abandoned their traditional agricultural practices. Annual production of both cash and food crops dropped significantly in the latter decades of 20th century, cocoa production dropped by 43% (Nigeria was the world's largest cocoa exporter in 1960), rubber dropped by 29%, cotton by 65%, and groundnuts by 64%.^[1] In spite of the large number of skilled, well-paid Nigerians who have been employed by the oil corporations, the majority of Nigerians and most especially the people of the Niger Delta states and the far north have become poorer since the 1960s.^{[citation needed]}

The Delta region has a steadily growing population estimated to be over 30 million people as of 2005, accounting for more than 23% of Nigeria's total population. The population density is also among the highest in the world with 265 people per kilometre-squared (reference NDDC). This population is expanding at a rapid 3% per year and the oil capital, Port Harcourt, along with other large towns are growing quickly. Poverty and urbanization in Nigeria are on the rise, and official corruption is considered a fact of life. The resultant scenario is one in which there is urbanization but no accompanying economic growth to provide jobs. This has ironically forced the growing populace to begin destroying the ecosystem that they require to sustain themselves.^[1]

The case of Ogoniland (1992-1995)

See also: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

See also: Ken Saro-Wiwa

Ogoniland is a 404 square-mile region in the southeast of the Niger Delta basin. Economically viable oil was discovered in Ogoniland in 1957, just one year after the discovery of Nigeria's first commercial petroleum deposit, with Shell and Chevron setting up shop throughout the next two decades. The Ogonis, a minority ethnic group of about half a million people who call Ogoniland home, and other ethnic groups in the region attest that during this time, the government began forcing them to abandon their land to oil companies without consultation, and offering negligible compensation. This is further supported by a 1979 constitutional addition which afforded the federal government full ownership and rights to all Nigerian territory and also decided that all compensation for land would "be based on the value of the crops on the land at the time of its acquisition, not on the value of the land itself." The Nigerian government could now distribute the land to oil companies as it deemed fit.^[2]

The 1970s and 1980s saw the government's empty promises of benefits for the Niger Delta peoples fall through, with the Ogoni growing increasing dissatisfied and their environmental, social, and economic apparatus rapidly deteriorating the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992. MOSOP, spearheaded by Ogoni playwright and author Ken Saro-Wiwa, became the major campaigning organization representing the Ogoni people in their struggle for ethnic and environmental rights. Its primary targets, and at times adversaries, have been the Nigerian government and the oil company Royal Dutch Shell.^{[citation needed]}

Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between Ogonis and the oil infrastructure escalated to a level of greater seriousness and intensity on both sides. Both parties began carrying out acts of violence and MOSOP issued an ultimatum to the oil companies (Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) which demanded some $10 billion in accumulated royalties, damages and compensation, and "immediate stoppage of environmental degradation", and negotiations for mutual agreement on all future drilling.^{[citation needed]}

The Ogonis threatened to embark on mass action to disrupt their operation if the companies failed to comply. By this act, the Ogoni shifted the focus of their actions from an unresponsive federal government to the oil companies engaged in their own region. The rationale for this assignment of responsibility were the benefits accrued by the oil companies from extracting the natural wealth of the Ogoni homeland, and neglect from central government.^{[citation needed]}

The government responded by banning public gatherings and declaring that disturbances of oil production were acts of treason. Oil extraction from the territory had slowed to a trickle of 10,000 barrels per day (.5% of the national total). However, because the withdrawal was a temporary security measure, it provided the government with a compelling reason to 'restore order'.^{[citation needed]}

Military repression escalated in May 1994. On May 21, soldiers and mobile policemen appeared in most Ogoni villages. On that day, four Ogoni chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally murdered. Saro-Wiwa, head of the opposing faction, had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, but he was detained in connection with the killings. The occupying forces, led by Major Paul Okuntimo of Rivers State Internal Security, claimed to be 'searching for those directly responsible for the killings of the four Ogonis.' However, witnesses say that they engaged in terror operations against the general Ogoni population. Amnesty International characterized the policy as deliberate terrorism. By mid-June, 30 villages had been completely destroyed, 600 people had been detained, and at least 40 had been killed. An eventual total of around 100,000 internal refugees and an estimated 2,000 civilian deaths was recorded.^{[citation needed]}

In May 1994, nine activists from the movement who would become known as 'The Ogoni Nine', among them Ken Saro-Wiwa, were arrested and accused of incitement to murder following the deaths of four Ogoni elders. Saro-Wiwa and his comrades denied the charges, but were imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially convened tribunal, hand-selected by General Sani Abacha, on 10 November 1995. The activists were denied due process and upon being found guilty, were executed via hanging by the Nigerian state.^{[citation needed]}

The executions were met with an immediate international response. The trial was widely criticised by human rights organisations and the governments of other states, who condemned the Nigerian government's long history of detaining their critics, mainly pro-democracy and other political activists. The Commonwealth of Nations, which had also plead for clemency, suspended Nigeria's membership in response. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU all implemented sanctions, however, none of these had an impact on oil production.^{[citation needed]}Shell asked the Nigerian government for clemency towards those found guilty, but its request was refused. However, a 2001 Greenpeace report found that "two witnesses that accused them [Saro-Wiwa and the other activists] later admitted that Shell and the military had bribed them with promises of money and jobs at Shell. Shell admitted having given money to the Nigerian military, who brutally tried to silence the voices which claimed justice".^[3]

As of 2006, the situation in Ogoniland has eased significantly, progressed by the transition to democratic rule in 1999. However, no attempts have been made by the government or an international body to bring about justice by investigating and prosecuting those involved in the violence and property destruction that have occurred in Ogoniland,^[4] although a class action lawsuit has been brought against Shell by individual plaintiffs.^[5]

Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts (1997)

The late 1990s saw an increase in the number and severity of clashes between militants of the Ijaw ethnic group, the largest in the entire Delta region with a population of over 7 million, and those of Itsekiri origin whose number is only about 450,000. The conflict between the two groups has been particularly intense in the major town of Warri. While the Ijaw and the Itsekiri have lived alongside each other for centuries, for the most part harmoniously, the Itsekiri were first to make contact with European traders, as early as the 16th century, and they were more aggressive both in seeking Western education and in using the knowledge acquired to press their commercial advantages; until the arrival of Sir George Goldie's National Africa Company (later renamed the Royal Niger Company) in 1879, Itsekiri chieftains monopolized trade with Europeans in the Western Niger region. Despite the loss of their monopoly, the advantages already held by the Itsekiri ensured that they continued to enjoy a superior position to that held by the Ijaw, breeding in the latter a sense of resentment at what they felt to be colonial favoritism towards the Itsekiri.

The departure of the British at independence did not lead, as might have been expected, to a decrease in tensions between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri. With the discovery of large oil reserves in the Niger Delta region in the late 1950s, a new bone of contention was introduced, as the ability to claim ownership of a given piece of land now promised to yield immense benefits in terms of jobs and infrastructural benefits to be provided by the oil companies. Despite this new factor, rivalry between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri did not actually escalate to the level of violent conflict between the two groups until the late 1990s, when the death of General Sani Abacha in 1997 led to a re-emergence of local politics.

The issue of local government ward allocation has proven particularly contentious, as the Ijaw feel that the way in which wards have been allocated ensures that their superior numbers will not be reflected in the number of wards controlled by politicians of Ijaw ethnicity. Control of the city of Warri, the largest metropolitan area in Delta State and therefore a prime source of political patronage, has been an especially fiercely contested prize. This has given birth to heated disputes between the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo about which of the three groups are "truly" indigenous to the Warri region, with the underlying presumption being that the "real" indigenes should have control of the levers of power, regardless of the fact that all three groups enjoy ostensibly equal political rights in their places of residence.

Ijaw unrest (1998-1999)

The December 1998 All Ijaw Youths Conference crystallized the Ijaws' struggle for petroleum resource control with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. In it, long-held Ijaw concerns about the loss of control of their homeland and their own lives to the oil companies were joined with a commitment to direct action. In the declaration, and in a letter to the companies, the Ijaws called for oil companies to suspend operations and withdraw from Ijaw territory. The IYC pledged �to struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice,� and prepared a campaign of celebration, prayer, and direct action 'Operation Climate Change' beginning December 28.

In December 1998, two warships and 10-15,000 Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states as the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) mobilized for Operation Climate Change. Soldiers entering the Bayelsa state capital of Yenagoa announced they had come to attack the youths trying to stop the oil companies. On the morning of December 30, two thousand young people processed through Yenagoa, dressed in black, singing and dancing. Soldiers opened fire with rifles, machine guns, and tear gas, killing at least three protesters and arresting twenty-five more. After a march demanding the release of those detained was turned back by soldiers, three more protesters were shot dead including Nwashuku Okeri and Ghadafi Ezeifile. The military declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa state, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and banned meetings. At military roadblocks, local residents were severely beaten or detained. At night, soldiers invaded private homes, terrorizing residents with beatings and women and girls with rape.

On January 4, 1999 about one hundred soldiers from the military base at Chevron�s Escravos facility attacked Opia and Ikiyan, two Ijaw communities in Delta State. Bright Pablogba, the traditional leader of Ikiyan, who came to the river to negotiate with the soldiers, was shot along with a seven-year-old girl and possibly dozens of others. Of the approximately 1,000 people living in the two villages, four people were found dead and sixty-two were still missing months after the attack. The same soldiers set the villages ablaze, destroyed canoes and fishing equipment, killed livestock, and destroyed churches and religious shrines.

Nonetheless, Operation Climate Change continued, and disrupted Nigerian oil supplies through much of 1999 by turning off valves through Ijaw territory. In the context of high conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian Federal Government (and its police and army), the military carried out the Odi massacre, killing scores if not hundreds of Ijaws.

Subsequent actions by Ijaws against the oil industry included both renewed efforts at nonviolent action and militarized attacks on foreign oil workers.

The creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (2000)

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established by President Olusegun Obasanjo with the sole mandate of developing the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of southern Nigeria. Since its inauguration, the NDDC has focused on the development of social and physical infrastructures, ecological/environmental remediation and human development.

The emergence of armed groups in the Delta region (2003-2004)

The ethnic unrest and conflicts of the late 1990s (such as those between the Ijaw and Itsekiri), coupled with a spike in the availability of small arms and other weapons, led increasingly to the militarization of the Delta. By this time, local and state officials had become involved by offering financial support to those paramilitary groups they believed would attempt to enforce their own political agenda. Conflagrations have been concentrated primarily in Delta and Rivers States.

Prior to 2003, the epicenter of regional violence was Warri. However, after the violent convergence of the largest military groups in the region, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom (both of which are comprised primarily of Ijaws), conflict became focused on Port Harcourt and outlying towns. The two groups dwarf a plethora of smaller militias supposedly numbering more than one hundred. The Nigerian government classifies these groups as "cults", many of which began as local university fraternities. The groups have adopted names largely based on Western culture, some of which include Icelanders, Greenlanders, KKK, and Vultures. All of the groups are constituted mostly by disaffected young men from Warri, Port Harcourt, and their sub-urban areas. Although the smaller groups are autonomous from within, they have formed alliances with and are largely controlled from above by either Asari and his NDPDF or Tom's NDV who provided military support and instruction.

The NDPVF which was founded by Asari, a former president of the Ijaw Youth Council, in 2003 after he "retreated into the bush" to form the group with the explicit goal of acquiring control of regional petroleum resources. The NDPFV attempted to control such resources primarily through oil "bunkering", a process in which an oil pipeline is tapped and the oil extracted onto a barge. Oil corporations and the Nigerian state point out that bunkering is illegal; militants justify bunkering, saying they are being exploited and have not received adequate profits from the profitable but ecologically destructive oil industry. Bunkered oil can be sold for profit, usually to destinations in West Africa, but also abroad. Bunkering is a fairly common practice in the Delta but in this case the militia groups are the primary perpetrators.^[6]

The intense confrontation between the NDPVF and NDV seems to have been brought about by Asari�s political falling out with the NDPVF�s financial supporter Peter Odili, governor of Rivers State following the April 2003 local and state elections. After Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from the NDPVF and began to support Tom�s NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.

Subsequent violence occurred chiefly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, with the two groups fighting for control of bunkering routes. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread property destruction.

The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and "self-determination." Consequently the state government felt the escalated the campaign against him by bringing in police, army, and navy forces that began occupation of the Port Harcourt in June 2004.

The government forces collaborated with the NDV during the summer, and were seen protecting NDV militiamen from attacks by the NDPVF. The state forces failed to protect the civilian population from the violence and actually increased the destruction of citizens' livelihood. The Nigerian state forces were widely reported to have used the conflict as an excuse to raid homes, claiming that innocent civilians were cahoots with the NDPVF. Government soldiers and police obtained and destroyed civilian property by force. The NDPVF also accused the military of conducting air bombing campaigns against several villages, effectively reducing them to rubble, because it was believed to be housing NDPVF soldiers. The military denies this, claiming they engaged in aerial warfare only once in a genuine effort to wipe out an NDPVF stronghold.

Innocent civilians were also killed by NDPVF forces firing indiscriminately in order to engage their opponents. At the end of August 2004 there were several particularly brutal battles over the Port Harcourt waterfront; some residential slums were completely destroyed after the NDPVF deliberately burning down buildings. By September 2004, the situation was rapidly approaching a violent climax which caught the attention of the international community.^[6]

The Nigerian oil crisis

After launching a mission to wipe out NDPVF, approved by President Olusegun Obasanjo in early September, Asari declared �all-out war� with the Nigerian state as well as the oil corporations and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on wells and pipelines.^{[citation needed]} This quickly caused a major crisis the following day on September 26, as Shell evacuated 235 non-essential personnel from two oil fields, cutting oil production by 30,000 barrels a day.

See also: Nigerian Oil Crisis

2006 MEND hostage situation

See also: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MILITARY Insurgent Organizations

Former Director General of the Nigerian Television Authority and later Minister for Information during the regime of General Sani Abacha, Dr Walter Ibekwe Ofonagoro, is a reporter�s delight any day. The Orlu, Imo state born Professor of History in his usual candour fielded questions from Sunday Sun at his Ikoyi, Lagos, residence recently.

In it, Ofonagoro spoke on issues confronting the Nigerian nation, including the root cause of the Niger Delta crisis, the controversial hand over of Bakassi peninsula, Humphrey Nwosu�s book on June 12, 1993 presidential election and the rule of law.

On Bakassi peninsula
I hope they would open up some internal investigation on the Bakassi case. Nigeria simply rushed to accept World Court jurisdiction and judgment without understanding what the case was all about. The Bakassi case was a very technical case. Cameroon was not saying that they owned Bakassi. All they were saying was that they signed a treaty with Britain in 1913 under which Britain gave them Bakassi. Cameroon went to World Court with one lawyer and three historians. Nigeria went there with many chiefs and big time lawyers, no historians.

This is a case for historians. In 1913, Britain signed an agreement with Germany and they called it the Holy Golan agreement under which Nigeria/Cameroon boundary was shifted from Rioderie to Akwuafre River thereby bringing Cameroon into the Germans� fare. But a year after that, 1914, something happened. They started something around June/July 1913, August 1914, the First World war started. And who was fighting it? Britain versus Germany! And once they started the war, Germany became an enemy, therefore Cameroon became an enemy.

Then France and Britain were the allies in that war and they were fighting Germany in Europe, naturally they would fight Germany in Africa. So from the Nigerian side, Britain attacked Cameroon, and from the Congo Brazaville and Central African Republic side, France also attacked Cameroon. They both moved into Cameroon and destroyed the Germans by 1916 and partitioned the territory and occupied it. Germany was effectively out of Cameroon by 1916. When the war ended in 1915, they went to Versile in France to go and negotiate the peace treaty. Americans came to that peace treaty as revolutionalists because America entered the war late in 1917 following the sinking of their ship in the high sea. So, the Americans came into this war, very anti-colonial, very pro-human-rights, and they said, no, this must give us an opportunity to address those issues that led to this war. Rivalry between great powers over who should be their slaves, who should be their colonies, therefore, no more colonies.

America said, look, these three colonies that Germany has should not be kept as spoils by the European powers, they should now be held by the league of nations pending when we can bring them to independence. That is how the idea of independence started. But in negotiating the treaties, France insisted that Germany must renounce all the territories that France conceded to her in the treaty of 1911. So Britain too said okay, if this treaty we are signing is based on the status quo between French Congo and German Cameroon in 1911, that one on the Nigerian side should also be based on the same period. You can�t be signing treaty on one side 1911, on another side 1913. When the French revoked the land constitution they gave to Germany and Germany renounced all claims to territory, it meant that effective by 1916, Germany was no longer a colonial power.

So, that treaty she signed with whoever concerning that territory was no longer a legal issue because it had been renounced in law. Two, the Anglo -German treaty of 1913 was now a nullity because you can�t renounce a treaty and then go and revalidate it. Once you renounce it, it has ceased to exist. That meant that if the French were basing the treaty they are signing with the League of Nations over what to do with the German-Cameroon, they are basing it on the Franco-German border as at 1911. That of Nigerian side should also be based on the Nigerian-German border as at 1911. That is why when Britain took over the rest of the Cameroon after the 1st World War and constituted it into Southern Cameroon and Northern Cameroon, Bakassi was not included in Cameroon. If Bakassi was part of German territory by 1916 based on the 1913 agreement, Britain would have included it in Southern Cameroon. Southern Cameroon and Britain now constituted a separate region in Nigeria in 1946, a year after the Second World war.

Southern Cameroon did not include Bakassi but they had 29 Assembly districts inside Cameroon and Bakassi was not included. Bakassi remained a part of Eastern Nigeria and was put as part of Eket local government and were representing Eastern House of Assembly and Eket local council. And later on, under a military rule, Bakassi was reorganized after Akwa Ibom left Cross River in 1991, Bakassi was removed from Eket local government and put into Akpabuyo Local government of Cross River State.

At no time was Bakassi part of the Cameroons they were talking about because whatever treaty the British signed in 1913 had been repudiated by Germany in 1916 and the French who now signed the final treaty in 1919 between Britain, France and the League of Nations were insisting that the treaty they were signing should be based on the boundaries of German-Cameroon as at 1911. Therefore, the British say �okay, ours too will be based on the boundaries between Nigeria and German-Cameroon�s as at 1911. And as at 1911, there was no treaty of 1913. Southern Cameroon and Northern Cameroon had the chance to do a plebiscite in 1961 to decide where they were going.

If Obansanjo had obeyed the rule of law, he would say of any, we have to do plebiscite to find out the wish of the people according to UN rules. If they say by 1913, these people were Cameroonians, therefore, we have to apply the trusteeship rules that says there must be a plebiscite supervised by the UN after which the people will decide where they are going. If they had done that, Bakassi would have voted to stay in Nigeria and there would be no bloodshed. But when you don�t obey the law, when you know everything, then you create more problems.

So, Yar�Adua is trying to introduce the rule of law. It may appear slow but it is fundamental to a stable democracy.
As a layman and one who is a Professor of History from one of the best universities in the world, I can tell you absolutely that disregard for the rule of law has cost Nigeria plenty. It has cost us Bakassi Peninsula; it has cost us the rights of the people of Bakassi, that their country pulled out its troops, abandoned them to a foreign power without giving them their rights recognized by International Law because somebody who was in power did not know how to apply the rule of law.

Constitutionally, Nigeria still owns Bakassi because Nigeria has not amended her constitution to remove Bakassi out of its territory. It is no longer being defended by Nigerian military because Obasanjo withdrew on its own, and for him to move in and out of a foreign territory, he is supposed to have the consent of the National Assembly. Did he get the approval of the National Assembly to evacuate that place? He didn�t!
Niger Delta imbroglio

The Niger Delta problem we have today has been inflicted on ourselves by the Nigerian people themselves, particularly the government. I hold the government responsible for the collapse of peace in the Niger Delta.
Before we got independence, our leaders, Western region and Northern region, Eastern region and the Western region sat together and negotiated at various conferences in Ibadan, Lagos and finally in London, Lancaster House, a constitution under which we are going to govern ourselves as an Independent nation. We agreed for semi-autonomous regions. We even defined how to get revenue. If the revenue is Petroleum, how much goes to who? The percentages were worked out and put in the 1960 constitution.

The constitution spelt out how the issue of revenue was resolved before independence based on 1960 constitution. As at 1960, we negotiated the basis of our union as a people. Our regional representatives went to Lancaster House in London and agreed on these terms. But following a civil war, one side imposed its own views on everybody else. And what is happening now is that the resources of the East and the Mid-west are being used to develop the West and the North to the neglect of the area where the revenue is coming from. That is why people from those areas are coming here to earn a living. Go to the East and the Mid-west, there is nothing there.

With the unrest in the Niger Delta in places like Port Harcourt and Warri, all the expatriates working in the Oil industry are now living in Lagos. They fly in to go and work and come back here to spend the benefits. So, what we have developing over there is anarchy.
The root of this crisis is that the constitution we had at Independence was not respected. After the civil war, the revenue allocation formula and constitution were not one of the causes of the civil war, what caused the civil war was seniority dispute between the colonels after the second coup. After the Gowon coup of 1967, there was dispute between (Emeka) Ojukwu and (Yakubu) Gowon and the others whether Gowon should be Head of State or not because he was junior to other people and that dispute got out of hand and they started fighting themselves. If they had not disputed seniority at the military level, would there have been a civil war? No! Mid-west conceded, North conceded, West conceded but East said No. They started fighting. Especially when Gowon went ahead to create states without consulting the East, the East�s reply was to secede.

When the civil war ended and somebody said �no victor, no vanquished�, it was really meant. It meant, �don�t worry, we won�t punish you but we will take your oil and your resources and make sure you remain marginalized�. We fought the civil war and Biafra was defeated. Once the Eastern region had been defeated, the first thing that the victorious federal forces did was to dispense with this derivation principle in the constitution, which had since been suspended in 1967 and derivation was abolished all together. It was only by 1979 that they said, �okay, we will give you one per cent�, and during Babaginda�s time they (also) said, �we will give you three per cent�. Abacha came along, he had his own constitutional conference and made13 per cent, Obasanjo came back and said, �No, I will make it seven per cent�. Then the Niger Delta youths took up arms.

Of course, the queried, �You took 50 per cent from me in 1967, by 1979 you gave me back one per cent; by 1993 you gave me back three per cent, and by 1999 you were supposed to give me 13 per cent, you said, �No, I am going to make seven per cent and that one, offshore is not there, we have to start fighting for it again�.
Then came to the Constitutional Reforms Conference, and they asked for 25 per cent and you said, �No�. Why not give them the 25 per cent and start settling down. Some conservative people in the North are saying that their leaders are the ones causing the trouble, that they used the money given to them irresponsibly. Whether they use it responsibly or irresponsibly, is it your money? I say give me my thing, you say the one I have, I�m using it irresponsibly, is it your money? Therefore, you won�t give me my thing. Ibos say that you must concede that somebody owns something before you talk about how to share it. Some people have even argued that the Niger Delta does not own the oil anymore.

If you can use the oil to build the bridge on top of the Lagoon in Lagos for 30 kilometers on water without any land, why can�t you build roads in Niger Delta? Niger Delta don�t have filling stations, they have to go to Port Harcourt to get fuel to drive their cars, no infrastructure, people are still living in shanties in mosquito infested swamps and they watch the oil flooding around their communities day-in, day-out and then they come to Lagos and Abuja and they see the wonders performed with the oil money, what do you want them to do? Conference after conference will not solve the problem; the government knows what to do. Since they already have a conference that says 25 per cent, they should present it to the National Assembly and they will now take decision.

What we said in 1999 is that it should be in the 1999 Constitution, which we wrote in 1994/95; that derivation should be at least 13 per cent. We did not say 13 per cent, we said at least 13 per cent, which means that it could be higher, certainly not lower. So, why do you need another conference to raise it? Without the conference, the National Assembly can raise it to 25 per cent because the constitutional basis is already there.

The boys went and brought out their guns and now they say they are getting nothing. That is why they are blowing up the pipe lines, and sabotaging all the oil installations.
What we are saying, for Heaven�s sake, is, be equitable in developing the country. All they need are roads, electricity, water and infrastructure and equitable share of federal attention.

Soldiers killed in Cameroon raid ....bbc

More than 20 Cameroonian soldiers have been killed during fighting in the Bakassi peninsula near the border with Nigeria, say Cameroon army officials.

Details of the clash remain unclear. Cameroonian military sources told the BBC the attackers wore Nigerian military uniforms and ambushed a boat.

But the Nigerian military are blaming militants from the volatile Niger Delta for the attack.

The Niger Delta lies just west of the sensitive and oil-rich peninsular.

Nigeria handed the Bakassi peninsula over to Cameroon more than a year ago in compliance with a ruling by the International Court of Justice.

Delta Militants?

The Nigerian army said the raid could have been carried out by the same group of gunmen that had earlier attacked a nearby oil terminal run by Exxon Mobil.

If so, this will be the first time that Nigerian militants have attacked Cameroonian territory, says the BBC's Alex Last in Nigeria.

He says there are a number of questions to be answered about why such a raid would be carried out now; was it simply an opportunistic attempt to grab weapons, or was it an attempt to show local Nigerian dissatisfaction with the Bakassi handover, or was it a deliberate attempt by a militant group to escalate the violence in the region?

So far, no-one has claimed responsibility.

The BBC's Randy Joe Sa'ah in Cameroon says that military sources told him the attackers wore Nigerian military uniforms and attacked a Cameroonian military boat carrying food intended for soldiers on the peninsula.

They killed the Cameroonian soldiers on board and put on their uniforms. They then went to the peninsula and shot and wounded more unsuspecting soldiers before getting away with some military equipment.

Our reporter says there is great surprise in the region at the incident as since the peaceful handover in August 2006, the area has been quiet.

Sovereignty Dispute

There were a series of bloody clashes between Nigeria and Cameroon in the 1990s.

 The peninsula had been administered by Nigeria since independence from Britain in 1960.

However, Cameroon based its claim of sovereignty over the region on maps dating back to the colonial era and was successful at the International Court of Justice after a lengthy case.

Bakassi juts into the Gulf of Guinea, an area which may contain up to 10% of the world's oil and gas reserves.

It is also rich in fish and most locals are fishermen.

The peninsula has been relatively quiet since the 2006 handover

Officials from Nigeria and Cameroon are meeting in Abuja to try to establish who killed 21 Cameroonian soldiers in the Bakassi peninsula on Tuesday.

Some witnesses said the attackers wore Nigerian Army uniforms, but it has blamed militants from the Niger Delta.

The main rebel group, Mend, has said it was not responsible, but has admitted its fighters attacked a nearby Nigerian oil installation earlier the same day.

Nigeria handed over the sensitive and oil-rich peninsula to Cameroon in 2006.

The peaceful transfer came after a ruling by the International Court of Justice which attempted to settle a territorial dispute that led to a series of bloody clashes between the two countries in the 1990s.

Bakassi juts into the Gulf of Guinea, an area which could contain up to 10% of the world's oil and gas reserves. It is also rich in fish.

Meanwhile, an armed group in Nigeria has blown up and ruptured a major oil pipeline, feeding one of two main crude oil export terminals in the Niger Delta.

Reports say dynamite was used in the attack on Thursday and a large volume of oil was spilled at the Forcados site.

'Mindless and ridiculous'

The BBC's Alex Last in Lagos says that most people in the Nigerian security world and even some armed groups in the Niger Delta believe that Tuesday's deadly attack was the work of a faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Mend).

It could not have been a government action from Nigeria, because relations between Nigeria and Cameroon are excellent   Col Solomon Giwa-Amu Nigerian military

Earlier the same day, 60 of its fighters, carried in seven speedboats, attacked the major Qua Iboe oil terminal in nearby Akwa Ibom state, it has acknowledged.

The raid in which the Cameroonians died, it is thought, was an attempt to grab more weapons, our correspondent says.

But in a new statement, Mend said it had not attacked the soldiers and instead blamed the Nigerian military.

"The murders of Cameroonian soldiers in Bakassi were carried out by the Nigerian military because of their perceived sympathy to our cause and their blind eye to a weapons [smuggling] route," it said on Wednesday evening.

The Nigerian authorities have vehemently denied any involvement in the incident and promised to co-operate with Cameroon to find out who was responsible.

"That is mindless and ridiculous," the Nigerian director of defence information, Col Solomon Giwa-Amu, told the Reuters news agency.

"It could not have been a government action from Nigeria, because relations between Nigeria and Cameroon are excellent."

Our correspondent says there is, of course, the chance that another group of gunmen were hired for the job, perhaps by those unhappy that the territory - once overwhelmingly populated by Nigerians - had been handed over to Cameroon.

But whoever was responsible, this attack has worried both countries as it shows how the violence of the delta can now spread beyond Nigeria's borders, he adds.

Bakassi handover ruled 'illegal' ....bbc

Nigeria's senate has approved a motion declaring that last year's handover of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon was illegal.

The upper house of parliament said that no part of Nigeria could be ceded without changing the constitution.

Senators called on the government to halt the transfer of areas along the border further north.

In 2002, the International Court of Justice ruled in favour of Cameroon in the two countries' border dispute.

The senate also called for more aid for those displaced by the handover - but did not say that Nigeria should retake Bakassi.

''The agreement reached to cede the Bakassi region to Cameroon was not tabled before the National Assembly," Senator Muhammad Mana told the BBC.

"Therefore everything on the agreement should be stopped until it has been ratified by the National Assembly.''

The vote comes at a time of heightened tensions in the area.

Nigeria reinforced troops on its side of the border after 21 Cameroon troops were killed in Bakassi two weeks ago.

It is not clear who carried out the attack - Nigeria's oil militants have denied claims they were responsible.

Nigerian troops withdrew in August 2006 but the peninsula will remain under Nigerian civil administration until 2008.

Most of the residents were Nigerian and bitterly opposed the handover.

Nigeria and Cameroon sought arbitration after a series of bloody clashes in the 1990s.

Bakassi juts into the Gulf of Guinea, an area which may contain up to 10% of the world's oil and gas reserves. It is also rich in fish.

The peninsula was administered by Nigeria since independence from Britain in 1960.

However, Cameroon based its claim of sovereignty over the region on maps dating back to the colonial era.

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